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OVERVIEW

The decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' in Wallace
InternationalSilversmiths, Inc. v. GodingerSilver Art Co.,' a trade
1. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Godinger will be referenced as
"the Godinger Court" or "the Court."
2. Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76 (2d
Cir. 1990), reh'gdenied, No. 90-7408 slip op. (2d Cir. Nov. 29, 1991), cert. denied
(Apr. 22, 1991). This decision will be referenced as "Godinger," "the Godinger
Decision," or "the Decision."
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dress3 infringement case involving two silverware manufacturers,
may well change the face of trade dress law in cases where ornamental design features are at issue. 4 In Godinger, the plaintiff'
sought to enjoin the defendant 6 from infringing the trade dress of its
GRANDE BAROQUE silverware7 which was recognized as "one of
the best-selling silverware lines in America."
The Court affirmed the district court's9 denial of relief ' on the
ground that the GRANDE BAROQUE trade dress was "aesthetically" functional.1 1 Thus, the defendant could not be enjoined from
marketing its 20TH CENTURY BAROQUE product line even
though:
1. the GRANDE BAROQUE pattern had acquired secondary
meaning 12
2. the goods were "virtually identical", 1 3 and 14
3. the trade dresses were "substantially similar".

In considering Godinger's "aesthetic" functionality defense, the
Court specifically rejected a test known as the "important ingredient" test, one which other courts.had found synonymous with "aes3. The "trade dress" of a product involves the overall look of the product and/
or the overall look of the product's packaging. Elements of a trade dress may include, inter alia, the texture, the shape, the color, the material and the ornamental
designs on the product itself or the product's packaging. LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart

Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke
Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983)).
4. The trade dresses at issue are depicted infra section II(A).
5. The plaintiff will be referenced as "Wallace" or "the plaintiff".
6. The defendant will be referenced as "Godinger" or "the defendant".
7. Like the Plaintiff's sterling silver GRANDE BAROQUE pattern, the Defendant's silver-plated 20TH CENTURY BAROQUE pattern consisted of typical "baroque style" design elements. As one silver historian has explained, "[t]he term
Baroque, in its modern, neutral sense, includes broad sweeping ornamentation,
bold and pronounced .. " A. SOMERS COCKS, Baroque Silver, 1610-1725, in
THE HISTORY OF SILVER 95 (C. Blair ed. 1987). Elaborate embossed scrolls and
floral patterns are generic elements which comprise the baroque style. See id. at
94-123.
8. Godinger, 916 F.2d at 77.
9. The Godinger district court decision will be referred to as "the District
Court" or "the Godinger District Court".
10. Wallace International Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 735 F.
Supp. 141, 144-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
11. Godinger, 916 F.2d at 81-82. While the Court's denial of injunctive relief
was clear, the basis for the denial is not readily apparent. At the beginning of the
Decision, the Court explained that the GRANDE BAROQUE design was completely unprotectible. Id. at 77. Yet, at the end of the Decision, the Court stated
that the design would have been protectible had the challenged design been
"identical or virtually identical". See infra Section V(A).
12. See infra note 37.
13. Godinger, 916 F.2d at 77.
14. Godinger, 735 F. Supp. at 142.
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thetic" functionality."8 In its place, the Godinger Court appears to
have formulated a new test for evaluating "aesthetic" functionality. " This new test will be referred to as the "conditional" functionality test.
The "important ingredient" test had mandated a preliminary inquiry as to whether the aesthetic appeal of the ornamental designs
on the product's trade dress had "contributed" to the sale of the
product. If the answer to that question was "yes", then trade dress
protection was denied.17 The application of this inflexible rule
often yielded harsh results.' 8
However, the newly crafted "conditional" functionality test does
not appear to be much more liberal than the "important ingredient"
test. The GodingerCourt seemingly mandates a "two-step" analysis
where the initial inquiry is whether the design elements of the product's trade dress are commonly used by competitors. If they are, the
court must then determine whether the defendant's design is "identical or virtually identical". The court may only grant trade dress protection if the designs are found to be "identical or virtually
identical".
Under Godinger,where ornamental features are found to be commonly used by competitors, the ultimate finding of functionality will
therefore be conditioned upon the circumstances. For example, in
situations where a defendant's design is "identical or virtually identical", the plaintiff's design will be "non-functional". Conversely, in
situations where a defendant's design is merely "substantially similar", the plaintiff's design will be "functional".' 9 The Godinger
Court appears to have created a new standard for evaluating "aesthetic" functionality which, it is suggested, can therefore best be referred to as "conditional" functionality.
It is submitted that the application of a "conditional" functionality
analysis could potentially allow the concurrent marketing of "confusingly similar" designs. Theoretically, any defendant could readily defeat an infringement claim by merely making minor changes to
a plaintiff's trade dress such that its "new" design was not "virtually
identical" to the original. This could result in the co-existence of
designs which are not only "substantially similar" but also "confusingly similar". This could occur because "substantially similar"
trade dresses are often "confusingly similar". 2 0 Paradoxically, this
result could well discourage free competition and encourage unfair
competition to the detriment of designers, manufacturers, and con15. See infre section III(B)(2Xa).
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Godinger, 916 F.2d at 81-82.

See infra section III(B)(2)(a).
See infra section III(B)(3)&(4).
Godinger, 916 F.2d at 82.
See infra sections V(B)-(D).
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suimers alike.2 1
It is further submitted that any functionality analysis is inapplicable to an evaluation of ornamental designs because competitive
need is a prerequisite to functionality and no such need exists in the
case of a design that is purely ornamental. Since competitors are
always free to create their own designs by merely rearrangingthe
composite elements of an earlier design, there is no need for slavish
copying of any ornamental design in its entirety. 2 2
Moreover, it appears that the Court's initial inquiry mandated by
the newly formed "conditional" functionality test contravenes the
basic tenet of the doctrine of functionality that a court should only
evaluate a trade dress in its entirety.23 It further appears that the
second inquiry contravenes another basic tenet that a finding of
functonality should be unconditional and should not be conditioned upon 24the degree to which the challenged design resembles
the original.
This article will provide a brief discussion of the trade dresses at
issue and the District Court decision.25 The article will then discuss
the evolution of the doctrine of "aesthetic" functionality 26 and an
alternative approach to evaluating the protectability of ornamental
features.27 The article will also discuss the apparent tension between Godinger and recent Second Circuit precedent. 28 Thereafter,' the article will explore the far-reaching implications and
inherent paradoxes of the Decision.2 9 Finally, an analysis of the Decision will serve as a springboard for the following two-fold proposal with respect to cases apposite to Godinger:
1. "aesthetic" functionality, "conditional" functionality, and
even "utilitarian" functionality, should all be rejected and in their
stead,
21. See infra section V(E).
22. See infra sections V(I)(1)&(2).
23. See infra section V(H)(1). This tenet underlies not only the law of functionality, but also all other aspects of trademark law. As the Tenth Circuit has explained,
any analysis of a trade dress entailing the dissection of the constituent design elements is "alien to the policies of the Lanham,,Act." Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1272.73 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908
(1988) (quoting Hartford House Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc. 647 F. Supp. 1533,
1539 (D. Colo. 1986)).
24. See infra section V(A).
25. See infra section I.
26. See infra sections II(B)(1)&(2).
27. See infra section III(A).
28. See infra section III(B)(4).
29. Notwithstanding that Godinger dealt with a very discrete class of goods,
"baroque silverware", the Decision does not contain any suggestion. that it is limited to the facts of this case.
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3
3
2. the "merely ornamental" rule 1 and the "PolaroidFactors" '
should be applied.
It is submitted that this approach would not only prevent the unwarranted appropriation of ornamental designs, but would also prevent the marketing of confusingly similar trade dresses thereby
simultaneously furthering the underlying purposes of both the doctrine of functionality and the Lanham Act.

II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Trade Dresses at Issue

"Every man was not born with a silver3 spoon in his mouth."3 2
3
"Yes, some are silver-plated copies."

The Godinger patterns are first and third from the left.
30. See infra section III(A)(2).
31. See infra section V(B).
32. M. CvANMmEs, DoN Quixomr

(1605).
33. Anon.

DE

LA

MAwcHA 926 (OzeU's rev. ed. 1950)
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1. The GRANDE BAROQUE Trade Dress
a. Description

In describing the Plaintiff's decorative product design, the District Court had observed that the pattern "is ornate, massive and
flowery: it has indented, flowery roots and scrolls and curls along
the side of the shaft, and flower arrangements along the front of the
shaft."' s4 It succinctly stated that "[i]n a word, it is 'Baroque'."3 " A
sterling silver prodcomplete set of Wallace's GRANDE BAROQUE
36
uct line retails for several thousand dollars.
b.

37
History/SecondaryMeaning

The District Court did not challenge the Plaintiff's assertion that
its GRANDE BAROQUE pattern had acquired secondary meaning.
Indeed, it stated:
I assume for purposes of this motion that anyone that sees, for instance, five lines of Baroque silverware will single out the Wallace line as being the "classiest" or the most handsome looking
and will immediately exclaim "Oh! That's the Wallace line. They
make the3 8 finest looking 'Baroque' forks!" That is secondary
meaning.

The Godinger Court apparently saw no need to reverse this find-

ing. 39 In fact, the Court observed that in 1990, the GRANDE BA-

ROQUE pattern had been on sale continuously for the past fifty
years and that it was one of the most popular silverware patterns in
the country with sales in excess of fifty million dollars.40
More than forty years ago, in R. Wallace & Sons Mfg. Co. v.
Ellmore Silver Co., 41 a federal district court made the GRANDE BA34. Godinger, 735 F. Supp. at 142. The Second Circuit adopted this description. Godinger, 916 F.2d at 77.

35. Godinger, 735 F. Supp. at 142.
36. Godinger, 916 F.2d at 77.
37. A trade dress is said to have acquired "secondary meaning" when it ,:an be
demonstrated that an appreciablenumber of consumers associate the proc(uct in
question primarily with a particular source. See, e.g., Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v.
Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982); Yannouth-Dion, Inc. v.
D'ion Furs, Inc., 835 F.2d 990, 993 (2d Cir. 1987).
The factors which a court evaluates are:
(1) sales success; (2) the senior user's advertising expenditures; (3)
unsolicited media coverage of the product; (4) consumer surveys; (5)
intentional copying of the product; and (6) length and exclusivity of the
product in the market.
PAF S.r.l. v. Lisa Lighting Co., Ltd., 712 F. Supp. 394, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). All
factors need not be proved. Id.
38. Godinger,735 F. Supp. at 144-45 (emphasis added).
39. See Godinger, 916 F.2d 76.
40. Id. at 77.
41. R. Wallace & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Ellmore Silver Co., 91 F. Supp. 703 (D. Conn.
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ROQUE pattern's tremendous commercial success a matter of public record, explaining that: "[s]ales of $7,000,000 (wholesale
prices) over a scant nine-year period, during five of which materials
and market were restricted by war-time conditions, seems very substantialindeed."'4 2 The R. Wallace decision buttresses the later finding that the GRANDE BAROQUE pattern had acquired secondary
meaning.43
2.

The 20TH CENTURY BAROQUE Trade Dress

Godinger's 20TH CENTURY BAROQUE product line had not
been sold to the public at the time the action was instituted. It consisted of a set of four silver-plated serving pieces with a suggested
retail price of twenty dollars.4 4
The District Court observed that, "defendant admits that the products are substantially similar. In fact, defendant45admits that it was
'aware of' and 'inspired by' plaintiff's product.1
3.

Third Party Competitors

Both the Plaintiff and the Defendant relied on evidence of the
proliferation of other competing baroque lines of silverware. The
Plaintiff argued that the Defendant did not have to copy its
GRANDE BAROQUE design in order to compete since other competitors had effectively competed without appropriating the Plaintiff's trade dress.4 6

Conversely, the Defendant argued that this evidence demonstrated that the Defendant did have to copy Plaintiff's design. The
crux of its argument was that the competitors' designs were just as
similar to Plaintiff's design.4 7
B.

The ProceedingsBelow
1. The Relief Sought

The Plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order, an evidentiary
hearing, a preliminary injunction and expedited discovery after
1950). In R. Wallace, the Plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest had successfully enforced its rights under a design patent for the GRANDE BAROQUE design and that
its design was, at the time of the decision, "unique". Id. at 706.
42. Id. at 708-9 (emphasis added).
43. See supra note 37.
44. Godinger, 916 F.2d at 77.
45. Godinger, 735 F. Supp. at 142.
46. E.g., Brief for Plaintiff 22-23. Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger
Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1990), reb'g denied, No. 90-7408, slip op. (2d
Cir. Nov. 29, 1991), petition for cert. denied, U.S.L.W. (U.S. Feb. 28, 1991)(No.
90-1366). Although this argument was raised in the Plaintiff's supporting memoranda, it was not discussed in either decision in this case.
47. Godinger 735 F. Supp. at 142.
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learning about an advertisement for the 20TH CENTURY BAROQUE product line. The application for a temporary restraining
order was made to prevent the Defendant from selling its product at
an impending table-top trade show. 48 The Plaintiff sought only to
enjoin the Defendant from copying its GRANDE BAROQUE pattern
in its entirety, not its elements.4 9
2.

Plaintiff's Burden under the Lanham Act

Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 50 allows for the protection of an
unregistered trade dress. Accordingly, since the GRANDE BAROQUE design was unregistered," the Plaintiff brought its action
under this section.5 2 To prevail, the Plaintiff was required to estab3
lish that:(1) its GRANDE BAROQUE silverware pattern had attained secondary meaning,- 4 and
(2) the 20TH CENTURY BAROQUE silverware pattern posed a
threat of confusion in the marketplace.5 5
48. Godinger,916 F.2d at 77.
49. See generally Godinger, 735 F. Supp. 141.
50. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides, in pertinent part that:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with
any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false
designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including
words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same,
and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce... shall be
liable to a civil action... by any person who believes that he is or is likely
to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1990).
51. Godinger, 735 F. Supp. at 143. The trade dress was also not covered bya
copyright registration.
52. See, e.g., Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 974 (2d Cir.
1987).
53. See LeSportsac 754 F.2d at 75.
54. This is the first element which a plaintiff must prove, since without adequate
proof thereof, a plaintiff's trade dress is unprotectable. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Plaintiff had met this burden. See supra note 37.
55. As one circuit court has explained:
[r]egardless of how much secondary meaning it possesses, a product's
trade dress will not be protected from an imitator that is sufficiently different in its features to avoid such confusion.
Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor Co., 731 F.2d 148, 151 (3rd Cir. 1984)
(citing LeSportsac, Inc. v. Dockside Research, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 602 (S.D.N.Y.
1979)) (emphasis added).
The district court did not evaluate this element because it had found that Plaintiff's pattern was "aesthetically" functional, and therefore, unprotectable. Godinger, 735 F. Supp. at 145-46.
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3. Defendant's Burden -

Functionality Defense

S6
In the Second Circuit, functionality is regarded as a defense,

one which the Defendant duly raised. However, it was incumbent
on the Defendant to establish that simulating the GRANDE BAROQUE pattern was a prerequisite for the Defendant to effectively

compete in the marketplace. The Defendant was also required to
prove that the purchasers of the GRANDE BAROQUE silverware
were primarily motivated to buy the Plaintiff's product because of
its aesthetic appeal, not because of its trademark significance. 7 No
evidence on these issues was introduced by the Defendant, and the
Decision did not address either issue."8
4.

The Disposition by the District Court

The District Court heard oral argument by both parties but declined to hold an evidentiary hearing. It denied all requests for preliminary relief, finding the GRANDE BAROQUE5 9design to be
"aesthetically" functional and hence, unprotectible
III.

PROTECTABILITY OF ORNAMENTAL DESIGNS
PRIOR TO GODINGER

A discussion of the evolution of the "aesthetic" functionality doctrine, as well as an alternate approach to the evaluation of ornamental design features, will provide the proper context for an analysis of
the Godinger Decision.
A.

Evaluating the Protectabilityof OrnamentalFeatures
Without Consideration of Functionality
1. Secondary Meaning

Early cases in which ornamental features of trade dresses were at
issue did not evaluate functionality. Rather, the sole issue was secondary meaning.
For example, in Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers, Frary & Clark,60
the defendants had made virtual copies of the plaintiff's trade
dresses. The Second Circuit enjoined the defendants, finding that
they had "simulat[ed] ...the collocation of details of appearance by
which the consuming public [had] come to recognize the product of
56. One federal district court has explained that "[t]he burden of proof ...rests
squarely" with a defendant to establish that the plaintiff's design is functional.
PAF S.r.l. v. Lisa Lighting Co., 712 F. Supp. 394, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
57. See infra section M(B)(4).
58. See Godinger, 735 F. Supp. 141.
59. Godinger, 735 F. Supp. at 145.
60. Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers, Frary & Clark, 131 F. 240 (2d Cir. 1904).
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his competitor. ' 6 1 In Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Alder,6 2 the Second Circuit evaluated the over-all impression created by each trade
dress in order to determine if they were confusingly similar. The
court explained:
while we cannot say that the appropriation by the defendant of
this particular feature or that particular feature would have been
unfair, we can say that when all of the prominent ones have been
appropriated, and so assembled together with slight variations in
some of them that altogether they produce the same general effect, and the ordinary purchaser would not be apt to discover
63 the
difference, enough appears to establish unfair competition.
In Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn' & Bishop Co.,6 4 Judge Learned

Hand stated that Enterprise and Yale represented "the cases of socalled 'non-functional' unfair competition ...."6, He explained that
these cases, "are only instances of the doctrine of 'secondary'meaning. All of them presuppose that the appearance of the article ...
has become associated in the public mind with the first comer as
manufacturer or source ....,66
2.

The Merely Ornamental Rule

It would appear that the "merely ornamental rule" is, in essence,
the modern name for the doctrine of secondary meaning as applied
specifically to ornamental features of trade dresses.6 7 In Anchor
Hocking,6 8 a case particularly apposite to Godinger,the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board (hereinafter "the TTAB") invoked the
merely ornamental rule to allow Corningware to register a blue floral chinaware design, even though competing manufacturers also
incorporated floral designs on their chinaware. 9 The TTAB explained that:
it is settled that merely because a design is ornamental does not
preclude it from becoming a valid trademark capable of distin61. Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
62. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Alder, 154 F. 37 (2d Cir. 1907).
63. Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
64. Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299 (2d Cir. 1917).
65. Id. at 300.
66. Id. (emphasis added). These cases were decided without consideration of
functionality. While it appears that no discussion of functionality was necessary,
Judge Hand's reference to these cases as " 'non-functional' unfair competition" decisions would seem to imply that he had, sub silentio, made a determination with
respect to functionality.
67. The initial application of the merely ornamental rule seems to have been in
In re Swift &'Co., 223 F.2d 950, 955 (C.C.P.A. 1955) (registration of a design on a
product label permitted).
68. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp. v. Coming Glass Works, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
288, 289 (T.T.A.B. 1969).
69. Id. at 292-95.
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guishing in commerce the particular goods upon which it is

placed. See In re Todd Co., Inc., 129 U.S.P.Q. 408 (C.C.P.A.
1961); and
In re David Crystal, Inc., 132 U.S.P.Q. 1 (C.C.P.A.
0
196 1).7
In In re ParamountPictures Corp., 71 the TTAB found that the pictures of the television characters "Mork & Mindy", when applied to
T-shirts and decals, functioned as valid trademarks. The TTAB
explained:
while not every sign used on a product, or on its label, package,
etc., functions as an indication of source of the product on which it
is used - e.g. some are merely part of the aesthetic ornamentation
- the broad and liberal interpretation of our law is that, where
such a sign also serves a source indicating function, it 7should
be
2
regarded as acceptable subject matter for registration.
In these cases, as with the " 'non-functional' unfair competition"

cases, the protectability of the ornamental design at issue was evaluated without resort to any doctrine of functionality, much less, to
"aesthetic" functionality. Rather, the sole consideration was secondary meaning.
B.

The Genesis, Schism, and Return to Functionality
1. "Traditional" Functionality

Prior to the advent of "aesthetic" functionality, the evaluation of
the functionality of mechanical designs had simply been referred to
as the doctrine of functionality. This judicial doctrine was created to
prevent the monopolization of product features necessary for the use
and/or manufacture of a competing product.7 3 As the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals7 4 explained, "[f]rom the earliest cases,
'functionality' has been expressed in terms of 'utility.' ,,7S
A finding of "functionality" had always sounded the death knell
for a plaintiff's claim of trade dress infringement. For example, at
the beginning of this century, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
explained that:
[i]n the absence of protection by patent, no person can monopo-

lize or appropriate to the exclusion of others elements of mechanical construction which are essential to the successful practical

operation of a manufacture, or which primarily serve to promote
70. Id. at 291 (emphasis added).
71. In re Paramount Pictures Corp., 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1111 (T.T.A.B. 1982).
72. Id. at 1113 (emphasis added). Accord In re Olin Corp., 181 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 182 (T.T.A.B. 1973).
73. In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
74. This court, [hereinafter "CCPA"], is the predecessor court to the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
75. In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1338 (C.C.P.A. 1982).

19911

"Conditional"Functionality

its efficiency for the purpose to which it is devoted.7 6

If a product feature is held functional:
the courts will never apply the "secondary meaning" doctrine so
as to create monopoly rights. The true basis of such holdings is
not that [the product features at issue] cannot or do not indicate

source to the purchasing public but that there is an overriding
public policy of preventing their monopolization, of preserving
the right to copy. A certain amount of purchaser confusion may
even be tolerated in order to give the public the advantages of
free competion."
Thus, the doctrine of functionality is a powerful doctrine, for its
application can, by judicial fiat, preempt a federal statute and allow
a first comer to lose the benefit of the good will associated with its
allowing the public to face possible
product while simultaneously
78
confusion as to source.
2.

The Schism which Created "Aesthetic" Functionality and
"Utilitarian" Functionality

The conception of "aesthetic" functionality and its complement,
"utilitarian" functionality, can be traced to a comment in Section
742 in the First Restatement of Torts.7 9 While Section 742 defines
functionality in traditional terms,8 0 Comment (a) introduced a distinction between mechanicaland ornamentalaspects of product de76. Marvel v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161 (2d Cir. 1904) (emphasis added). Accord
Pope Automatic Merchandising Co. v. McCrum-Howell Co., 191 F. 979, 981 (7th
Cir. 191 1)(cylindrical shape of vacuum cleaner found "functional" on the ground
that it was essential for mechanical operation of product and therefore necessary to
compete).
77. See supra note 73. In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 504
(C.C.P.A. 1961) (emphasis added). For example, in Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All
Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1980), the designer of a wood
burning stove sued for infringement of the stove's trade dress. It was conceded that
the plaintiff had created the trade dress and that the public had come to associate
that product's trade dress with the plaintiff. Notwithstanding these findings, the
court, albeit reluctantly, found the trade dress functional. The court explained,
[p]laintiff designed a stove with several functional innovations. These
were enthusiastically received in the marketplace. Defendant, in imitating
them, is doubtless sharing in the market formerly captured by the plaintiff's skill and judgment. While we sympathize with plaintiff's disappointment at losing sales to the imitator, this is a fact of-business life.

Id. at 196 (emphasis added).
78. Id. Accord Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp.
973, 980 (M.D. Tenn. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972) and
Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738, 744-45 (D. Haw. 1979), aff'd
mem., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981).
79. RESTATE mT (FiRsT) OF ToRTS § 742 comment a (1938).
80. RESTATEMENT (FiRsT) OF TORTS § 742 (1938). Section 742 designates a design
of goods as "functional" if it "affects the purpose, action or performance, or the
" Id.
I.
facility or economy of processing, handling or using them .
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signs. This "distinction" would ultimately give rise to a spurious
schism within the doctrine of functionality creating the dual doctrines of "aesthetic" and "utilitarian" functionality."1
a. "Aesthetic" Functionality
Comment (a) stated, in pertinent part, that:
[wihen goods are bought largely for their aesthetic value, their
features may be functional because they definitely contribute to
that value and thus aid the performance of an object for which the
goods are intended. 2
However, it was not until some fifteen years later in Paglierov. Wallace China Co.,83 that the budding doctrine of "aesthetic" functionality was to come into full flower. In Pagliero, the defendant had
made identical copies of four floral patterns covering "vitrified hotel
china" plates.8 4 Thus, in certain respects, Pagliero bears a striking
similarity to Godinger. For example, the goods at issue were tabletop products. Further, the designs had been bona fide creations by
the plaintiff, not just stock designs.8 5 Finally, the plaintiff had requested a very limited injunction. It only sought protection for its
specific unique designs; it did not seek a monopoly on all floral designs for china patterns.8 6
The Paglierodistrict court issued a preliminary injunction covering both the names and the designs at issue. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit upheld the injunction with respect to the names, but reversed with respect to the designs.8 7
The appellate court had observed that the "[p]urchase of hotel
china is induced, in part, by virtue of its attractive appearance," 8 8
81. E.g., Plasticolor Molded Prods. v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F. Supp. 1329, 133637 n.11 (C.D. Cal. 1989) ("Recent authority has suggested the existence of two
distinct types of functionality, 'aesthetic functionality' and 'utilitarian
functionality' ").
82. RESTATEMENT (FiRST) or TowRS, § 742 comment a (1938).
83. Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339(9th Cir. 1952). Coincidentally, the plaintiff in Paglierowas also named "Wallace", but is "no relation" to the
Plaintiff.
84. The defendant had also copied each of the names for the four floral patterns.
Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 340.

85. One trademark commentator has stated that:

[i]t is clear that Wallace China had done more than attempt removal of a
common theme or device from the public domain; it developed several
theretofore unknown designs, [and] affixed them as china ornament[ation].
B.J. Duft, Aesthetic Functionality, 73 TRADEMARK REr. 151, 178 (1982). See supra
note 41.
86. See Pagliero, 198 F.2d 339. In addition, the designs in both cases were not
covered by federal trademark or copyright registrations. Id. at 341 and see supra
note 51.
87. Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 339.
88. Id. at 340.
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and that "these designs are not merely indicia of source." 9 On the
basis of these observations, the court then concluded that the design
was functional. The court explained, " '[f]unctional' in this sense
might be said to connote other than a trade-mark purpose."9 0 This
enigmatic pronouncement was followed by what was destined to be
the most quoted sentence in the entire decision: "[if the particular
feature is an important ingredientin the commercial success of the
product, the interest in free competition permits its imitation in the
absence of a patent or copyright."9 1
This statement provided the precedent that a trade dress is not
entitled to protection in all cases where it serves dual functions of
source indiction and decoration. This holding came to be known
not only as the doctrine of "aesthetic" functionality, but also as the
"important ingredient in commercial success" standard, or the "important ingredient" test.92
b.

"Utilitarian"Functionality

It is submitted that the term "utilitarian" functionality is not very
"utilitarian" because it contains an inherent redundancy. Thirty
years after Pagliero, the CCPA flatly stated that "'[flunctional'
means 'utilitarian'." 9 3 Nonetheless, with the advent of "aesthetic"
functionality, "traditional" functionality came to be referred to as
"utilitarian" functionality in order to distinguish it from "aesthetic"
functionality. 94 However, under the CCPA's edict, there is no distinction between "aesthetic" functionality and "utilitarian"
functionality. 95
89. Id. at 344 (emphasis added). As in Godinger, the Pagliero court "assumed"
the plaintiff's design had acquired secondary meaning and yet found for the
defendant.
90. Id. at 343.
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 643 (2d Cir.
1979); Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J.-Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir.
1981); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 517 (10th Cir. 1987);
Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 977 (2d Cir. 1987); Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 423 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989);
Prufrock, Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 134 (8th Cir. 1986); Fabrica, Inc. v. El
Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 1983); Hess v. Bland, 347 F.2d 835
(C.C.P.A. 1965); Villeroy & Boch v. THC Systems, Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA)
2027, 2029 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); STX, Inc. v. Trik Stik, Inc.; 708 F. Supp. 1551, 155859 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Freddie Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Ridgeline, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 72,
77 (N.D. Tex. 1984), aff'd without op., 783 F.2d 1062 (5th Cir. 1986). See also
infra section III(B)(3).
93. Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1338.
94. See Plasticolor,713 F. Supp. at 1336-37 n.ll.
95. Professor McCarthy has suggested "[t]hat both words 'utilitarian' and 'aesthetic' are appended to the same base word 'functionality' is misleading semantics.
Ornamental aesthetic designs are the antithesis of utilitarian designs." 1 J.T. McCARTY, TRADEMARK & UNFAUR COMPEMTION § 7:26, at 247 (2d ed. 1984).
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3.

Widespread Disavowal of Pagliero by Other Circuits

A review of recent circuit court decisions reveals that prior to
Godinger, virtually all circuits9 6 had specifically rejected Pagliero's
"important ingredient" test finding it:

1. a superfluous addition to the law of functionality, and/or
2. antithetical to the realities of modern business practices since
many trademarks are selected precisely because of their aesthetic
97
appeal.
Even the Ninth Circuit had come to disavow its own creation. For
example, in First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer Inc.,9 8 the court explained that:
[i]n this circuit, the "aesthetic" functionality test has been limited,
Vuitton, 644 F.2d at 773, if not rejected, Fabrica v. El Dorado

Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 1983), in favor of the "utilitarian" functionality test. 99
96. It appears that only the Fourth Circuit has not done so. See infra notes 97116 and accompanying text.
97. It does not appear that any trademark commentators have approved of "aesthetic" functionality in recent years. The following is illustrative of the wide-spread
disapproval in the academic community:
1. 1 J.T. McCim'ri, TADM4Ams & UmnAM CorPrrrnoN § 7:26, at 246-47
(emphasis added) ("the 'important ingredient in the commercial success of the product' formulation is much too open-ended and vague to
be a useful rule of law. Taken literally, it negates all trademarks.)
2. J.B. Swimm, The Design of RestaurantInteriors- A New Approach to
Aesthetic Functionality,75 TRADnMARK REP. 408, 412 n.21 ("[aesthetic
functionality] should be broadly redefined by returning to trademark
fundamentals.")

3.

4.
5.
6.

7.

98.
99.

A.L. Firrcmm, The Defense of "Functional"Trademark Use: If What
Is Functional Cannot Be a Trademark, How Can a Trademark Be
Functional? 75 TRAuD)x REP. 249, 268 (1982) (emphasis added)
("['Aesthetic functionality'] appears to serve no useful or necessary
purpose. It should be buried.")
B.J. Du'r, Aesthetic Functionality,73 Twwvtm
m REP. 151, 202 (1982)
(" 'Aesthetic' functionality is a game with no rules.")
A.S. ODDI, The Functions of "Functionality"in Trademark Law, 76
TRAzu m REP. 308, 348 (1986) ("From the outset, 'aesthetic functionality' has proved to be a controversial and ill-defined concept.")
Note, The Broad Sweep of Aesthetic Functionality: A Threat to Trademark Protection of Aesthetic Product Features, 57 FoRDHAm L. Rzv.
345, 348 (1982) ("In denying trademark protection to aesthetic features on the basis of mere consumer appeal, courts fail to recognize
that businessmen in today's mass marketing economy must select aesthetically pleasing product features to encourage consumer demand
for their products.")
A. ZELICK, The Doctrine of "Functionality",73 TRADEmApz REP. 128,
141 n.43 (1983) ("['aesthetic' functionality] skews the balance too far
in favor of the pro-copying theory of competition and totally ignores
the concept of progress by reward to the innovator.")
First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1382 n.3.
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In Sicilia Di. R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox,' 0 0 the Fifth Circuit concluded
that "[d]efining functionality as anything that is 'an important ingredient in the commercial success' of a product would almost always
permit a second comer freely to copy the trade dress of a successful
product that has accumulated good will."' 1 1 In rejecting the "important ingredient" test, the courts have essentially returned to the
judicial doctrine developed in the early twentieth century. 10 2
4.

Recent Second Circuit Treatment of Pagliero
Prior to Godinger

Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc.,' 0 ' signaled the Second Circuit's
return to the fold of traditional functionality. 10 4 In Warner, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had infringed ornamental designs on Warner's toy cars. The Warner court applied the traditional test for functionality, explaining:
More recently courts have continued to understand the functionality defense as a way to protect useful design features from being
monopolized. The Supreme Court, in Inwood Laboratories,Inc. v.

05
Ives Laboratories,'
defined a functional feature as one that "is
essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost
or quality of the article." A design feature of a particular article is
"essential" only if the feature is dictated by the functions to be

performed ....

16

100. Sicilia Di. R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1984).
101. Id. at 427-28. Accord W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 340 (7th

Cir. 1985); Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 378 (1st Cir. 1980);
Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 519 (10th Cir. 1987); John H.
Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 982 n.27 (1lth Cir. 1983); In re
Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1338 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Truck
Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1218 (8th Cir. 1976);
Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981); Tast-T-Nut
Co. v. Variety Nut &Date Co., 245 F.2d 3, 7-8 (6th Cir. 1957).
102. See supra section III(B)(1). Some courts have maintained the redundant
term "utilitarian" functionality using it in lieu of "traditional" functionality, while
others use the two terms interchangeably. See, e.g., FirstBrands, 809 F.2d at 1382
and Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 429, n.8. Other courts have not only explicitly rejected
"aesthetic" functionality, but have also implicitly rejected "utilitarian" functionality, for they merely refer to "functionality" as the new doctrine. See, e.g., Brunswick
Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 517-19 (10th Cir. 1987). It is submitted,
however, that as long as the courts have held that a specific doctrine for evaluating
the functionality of ornamental features on trade dresses is unnecessary, the name
accorded the umbrella doctrine of functionality is merely a matter of semantics.
103. Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, 724 F.2d 327 (2d.Cir. 1983).

104. Zippo ManufacturingCo. v. RogersImports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y.
1963) contains a particularly thoughtful discussion of the early confusion in the
Second Circuit with respect to the proper application of the doctrine of "aesthetic"
functionality.
105. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 850-52 n. 10
(1982) (dictum).
106. Warner, 724 F.2d at 331 (emphasis added). This definition of functionality
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Yet, two weeks later, in Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v.
Charles Craig,Ltd.,10 7 the Second Circuit applied the "important
ingredient" test. However, the Second Circuit has not applied this
test since the Industria decision.
One month later, in LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 1 8 the court
observed that the "important ingredient" test had a questionable status in view of the earlier Warner decision, 10 9 adding the following
qualification:
we do not suggest that (the "important ingredient" test] cannot be
appropriately applied in certain circumstances. The "important
ingredient" definition achieved its most quoted formulation in the
context of a product, hotel china, the essential feature of which
was the aesthetic appeal of its design.10

Although the LeSportsac court did not formulate a formal test, per
se, it did establish that the following edicts should be central in determining functionality:
1. ornamental design elements must be viewed in their entirety,
not individually,
2. hindrance to competition is a primary consideration, and
3. "attractive" and "protectible" are not mutually exclusive
terms.' '

Under the "important ingredient" test, "attractive trade dress"
and "protectible trade dress" are, in effect, mutually exclusive.
Hence, it would appear this test is completely irreconcilable with
the LeSportsac test. Where one is followed, the other cannot properly be applied."12
Later that same year, in Morex S.p.A. v. Design Institute America,

Inc.,1 3 the Second Circuit clarified its position, explicitly explaining that "(tihe Craig [Industria]standard for functionality was implicseems to paraphrase early 20th century definitions of functionality. See supra section M(B)(1).
107. Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig, Ltd., 725 F.2d 18,
19 (2d Cir. 1984).
108. LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart, Inc., 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985).
109. Id. at 77.
110. Id. at 77-78 (quoting Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 343). The LeSportsac court may
have included this qualification in deference to the particular panel that had decided Industria. This inference is supported by the following suggestion by the
Tenth Circuit: "The Second Circuit did not reject the important ingredient test in
all cases. The implication in LeSportsac, however, is that the fact finder must always also consider whether the ingredient primarilyidentifies the product source."
Brunswick, 832 F.2d at 516 n.3.
111. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 77-78.
112. See supra note 110.

113. Morex S.p.A. v. Design Institute America, Inc., 779 F.2d 799, 801 (2d Cir.
1985) (per curiam).
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itly rejected... by our decision in LeSportsac."' 114
Approximately one year thereafter, in Stormy Clime Ltd. v.
ProGroup,Inc.," 5 the court explained:
We do not mean to suggest that the functionality inquiry is
equivalent to the "important ingredient in commercial success"
test applied in Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles
Craig, Ltd... and limited in LeSportsac ....a critical aspect in

considering hindrance to competition is whether bestowing trade
dress protection on a product design prevents potential competitors from entering a market that is not foreclosed by a valid patent.
Thus, a distinctive design or arrangement of features that is an
importantingredientin the commercialsuccess of a product but is
not "essential to the use or purpose" of the product and does not
"aifectig the1 cost
or quality" of the product could be protectible
16
trade dress.

Thus, the Stormy Clime appears to have followed and elaborated on
the LeSportsac court's approach.
IV.

THE GODINGER DECISION

A.

The Rejection of Pagliero

The Godinger Court made it clear that Pagliero was no longer
good law in the Second Circuit. The Court stated that, "[w]e rejected Pagliero, in LeSportsac . . . and reiterate that rejection
here."' 17

B.

The Restatement Test

The Godinger Court adopted the test for functionality as formu18
lated in the Third Restatement of the Law, Unfair Competition.'
114. Id. at 801 (emphasis added). Accord Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F.
Supp. 658, 667 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
The LeSportsac court had noted that an "obvious tension" existed between the
Warner and the Industria decisions. LeSportsac 754 F.2d at 77. The Morex court,
which was per curiam, attempted to resolve the tension between the LeSportsac
and Industfra approaches to functionality. The Morex court explained that since
the LeSportsac decision had been filed one month after the Industria decision had
been issued, the Industriacourt could not have reviewed that decision. Morex, 779
F.2d at 801. This appears to suggest that had the Industriapanel been "privy" to
the LeSportsac decision, it would not have applied the '"important ingredient" test.
115. Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1987).
116. Stormy Clime, 809 F.2d at 977 (emphasis added); see Inwood Laboratories,
Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.50 (1982); accord PAF S.r.l. v.
Lisa Lighting Co., 712 F. Supp. 394, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Artemide SpA v. Grandlite Design and Mfg. Co., 672 F. Supp. 698, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)(decorative designs of lamps at issue, "aesthetic" functionality rejected).
117. Godinger, 916 F.2d at 80.
118. JEsTATEMNT (THIR) OF THE LAw oF UNut CoMImTrON § 17 (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1990).
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This test follows a standard similar to that which has been accepted
by most other circuits as well as the LeSportsac and Stormy Clime
courts" 9 and was articulated by the Godinger Court as follows:
where an ornamental feature is claimed as a trademark and trademark protection would significantly hinder competition by limit-

ing the range of adequate alternative designs, the aesthetic
functionality doctrine denies such protection.'

o

However, while rejecting the "important ingredient" test, the Court
retained the phrase "aesthetic" functionality,' 2' and therefore, presumably, the concept.

C.

The "Conditional" Functionality Test

The Godinger Court appears to have formulated a unique "twostep" analysis' 2 2 for the application of the Restatement test which
introduces two new standards. This "two-step" analysis comprises
the newly formulated "conditional" functionality test.
1. The "Analysis of Individual Design Elements" Standard
The first "step" seems to require evaluation of each design element individuafly in order to determine whether it is "commonly
23
used". 1
2.

The "Identical or Virtually Identical" Standard

The second "step" requires that in cases where the court finds the
elements in common use, it may then only grant protection to the
over-all design in instances where the accused 4design constitutes an
2
"identical or virtually identical" trade dress.1
119. See supra sections III(B)(3)&(4).
120. Godinger at 81 (emphasis added). While the Restatement test does not use
the phrase "aesthetic" functionality, Comment c acknowledges the doctrine's continued viability. RESTATEMEN (nmW) OF TM LAw O UNFAm CoNP-rMoN § 17, comment c (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1990).
121. Id. See infra section V(D).
122. While the Court never specifically articulated this test, perse, it is suggested
that a court must apply this test in order to follow the Court's ruling. See Godinger,
916 F.2d at 82.
123. Godinger, 916 F.2d at 81. The Court never actually uses this phrase. However, it is suggested that the Court's language provides a reasonable basis from
which to infer that this, or a similar phrase describes the type of design elements at
issue in Godinger. For example, the Court explained that, "Wallace seeks... protection, not for a precise expression of a decorative style, but for... elements of a
style that is part of the public domain." Id. at 81.
It is possible that future courts will limit this decision to cases involving ornamental features of baroque silverware. However, the Court does not state, nor even
suggest, that it is limiting its ruling to the facts of this case. See Godinger,916 F.2d
76.
124. Id. at 82.
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D.

The Disposition by the Court

Curiously, the Court seems to have issued contradictory rulings
on functionality. In the very beginning of the Decision, the Court
stated that it was affirming the District Court's finding that the Plaintiff's design was functional, and thus, in all circumstances, unprotectible.1 25 However, at the end of the Decision, the Court ruled
that the design would have been protectible, (and hence non-functional) if the challenged design had been "identical or virtually
identical".126 This enigmatic dichotomy will be discussed directly
below.
V.

THE INHERENT PARADOXES AND IMPLICATIONS
OF GODINGER
A.

The Dual Rulings on Functionality

One of the most perplexing aspects of the Decision is that in attempting to clarify the Second Circuit's view of "aesthetic" functionality, the Court, instead, rendered two conflicting rulings.
At the beginning of the Decision, the Court stated that it was affirming the District Court's finding that "the GRANDE BAROQUE
design is a 'functional feature of 'Baroque' style silverware'. "127
The Court then explained that as a result of this finding of function128
ality, the design was "not subject to protection as a trademark."'
However, the end of the Decision contains a ruling which suggests a direct conflict with the ruling quoted above. The Court held
that the GRANDE BAROQUE pattern might be protected against
"identical or virtually identical" designs. 129 Implicit in this latter
ruling is the finding that the GRANDE BAROQUE design is not
functional.
One possible explanation for these conflicting findings is that the
Court found the design to be, in effect "conditionally" functional.
In other words, a design may or may not be functional depending on
how closely the challenged design mimics that of the plaintiff.
However, the CCPA had made clear that a design is either functional or it is not.13 0 There is no medium ground. Similarly, the Fifth
Circuit has explained, "a design cannot be found both legally functional-that is, not entitled to trademark protection-and 'sufficiently
distinctive' [in order] to serve as an indicator of source." 1 3 Taking
125. Godinger, 916 F.2d at 77.
126. Id. at 82.

127. Godinger, 916 F.2d at 77.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 82.
Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1343 n.4.
Sno-Wizard, 791 F.2d at 427 n.4 (quoting Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 425).
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a contrary view, the Godinger Court has turned the "aesthetic"
functionality analysis into a chameleon-like doctrine.
The Court's creation of "conditional" functionality may represent
an attempt to find a compromise ruling based on a belief that the
GRANDE BAROQUE trade dress lacked distinctiveness, and therefore, was entitled to only limited protection.13 2 However the CCPA
had explained that although the issues of distinctiveness and functionality must both be addressed in assessing trade dress protectability, they are nonetheless separate issues which must be
addressed accordingly.13 3 The court explained that a "truism" of
the law of functionality is that "a non-distinctive design does not
necessarily equal a 'functional' design."'1

3

4

Consequently, in Mor-

ton-Norwich, the CCPA reversed the TTAB's finding of functionality
which had apparently been premised on a conclusion the design
was "ordinary". 13

Applying the Morton-Norwich analysis to the facts of Godinger,
the Court's ruling on functionality should not have been affected by
a belief that the GRANDE BAROQUE design was "ordinary".
Rather, a conclusion as to the distinctiveness of the trade dress
should have been addressed in an analysis of the merits of the
case. 136

B.

The "Confusingly Similar" Test

Where a trade dress is found protectible and non-functional, a
court must evaluate whether the challenged trade dress is "confusingly similar". This inquiry is mandated both by statute13 7 and by
common law.1 38 Further, a court must evaluate the trade dress, as a
132. This inference is suggested, for example, by the Court's adoption of the following observation by the District Court:
there is a substantial market for baroque silverware and ...effective competition in that market requires "use [of] essentially the same scrolls and
flowers" as are found on Wallace's silverware.
Godinger, 916 F.2d at 80 (quoting Wallace Int'l Silversmiths v. Godinger Silver
Art Co., 735 F. Supp. 141, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
133. Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1343.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. Id. The court added that the TTAB's finding that the trade dress at issue was
incapable of functioning as a trade dress was an "unexpressed (and perhaps unconscious)" conclusion. Id.
136. See infra note 141 and section V(B).
137. Lanham Trademark Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1989).
138. Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1275 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988); Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting
Co., 618 F.2d 950, 953-54 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 832 (1982);
American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 664 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980); Harlequin Enterprises v. Gulf & Western
Corp., 644 F.2d 946, 949 (2d Cir. 1981); Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846
F.2d 1118, 1124-25 (7th Cir. 1988).
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whole, by weighing certain considerations
referred to in the Second
l9
Circuit as the "PolaroidFactors".1
140
The Court found the GRANDE BAROQUE pattern protectible.
However, the Court appears to have "side-stepped" a "Polaroid
Factor" analysis and based its ruling solely on a determination of
functionality. 14 1 Perhaps the Court had intended that its limited
grant of protection would be applied only as a limited response to a
functionality defense. However, since the ruling granted some protection to the GRANDE BAROQUE trade dress, it was incumbent
upon the Court to then apply the "PolaroidFactors" in order
to pre14 2
vent the marketing of a "confusingly similar" trade dress.
The following three "PolaroidFactors" would have been central
to a determination of "confusing similarity":
1. the strength of the Plaintiff's trade dress,
2. the similarity of the trade dresses, and the
143
3. similarity of the goods.
After weighing these factors, the Court could still have concluded
that only "virtually identical" trade dresses posed a likelihood of
confusion. However, the Court decided the scope of protection by
only specifically considering one of the three central factors. In doing so, it not only failed to consider all the relevant "PolaroidFactors", but it also failed to apply the accepted standard of

"substantial similarity".
C.

The "SubstantialSimilarity" Standard

As stated above

44,

the Court's limited grant of protection ap-

139. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961). Although the "PolaroidFactors" had originally
been applied to trademark cases, they have since been applied to trade dress cases
as well. Eg., RJR Foods, Inc. v. White Rock Corp., 603 F.2d 1058, 1061 (2d Cir.
1979).
140. This finding is supported by the Court's grant of protection against "identical or virtually identical designs". Godinger, 916 F.2d at 82.
141. The Court explained that "[o]ur review.., focuses on the functionality issue." Id. at 78 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding that the Court may not have
intended to "reach the merits" of the case, it nonetheless found that a defendant's
"identical or virtually identical" design would constitute an infringement. Id. at 82.
Given that the issue of infringement was central to the "merits" of the case, the
Court therefore appears to have, in effect, decided the-"merits".
142. The failure to apply the "PolaroidFactors" was particularly problematic in
Godinger,given that the president of a major retailer had experienced actual confusion. Id. at 77. Although no one factor is dispositive, proof of actual confusion
by an independent retailer represents persuasive evidence that the trade dresses
are "confusingly similar". Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 725 F. Supp.
790, 796-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
143. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 256, 258
(2d Cir. 1987).
144. See supra section V(A).
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pears to be based on an implicit belief that Plaintiff's design was
weak. 145 However, as Professor McCarthy has observed, "[elven if
the mark is relatively 'weak', it is entitled to protection against a
14
closely similar mark used on competitive goods." 1
The standard applied by the courts to evaluate "closely similar" is
1 47
"substantially similar", not "identical or virtually identical."'
However, Godinger, in essence, has eliminated the standard of
"substantial similarity" since in relevant cases, only two types of
designs will be recognized:
1) identical and virtually identical designs, and
2) merely similar designs.
Those designs deemed "merely similar" will constitute each and
every design not "identical or virtually identical" to the first comer's
trade dress. The latter, "catch-all" group will inevitably include
many designs that are not only "substantially similar" but are also
148
"confusingly similar" designs.
D.

Competitive Goods

It is well settled that where goods are directly competitive, and
the trade dresses are "substantially similar", the likelihood of confusion is greatly increased. 1 4 9 Hence, disallowing protection with respect to competitive goods bearing "substantially similar" trade
dresses will inevitably result in the proliferation of "confusingly similar" goods in the marketplace.
145. This inference is based on the Court's numerous comments that the same
baroque elements are commonly used by all manufacturers of baroque silverware.
See Godinger,916 F.2d at 81-82. The Court appears to have concluded that since
all competitors use these same design elements, the design, in its entirety, is common. See id.
146. 2 J.T. McC~uwy, supra note 95, at 181 (emphasis added).
147. Eg., Allied Mktg. Group, Inc. v. CDL Mktg., 878 F.2d 806, 813 (5th Cir.
1989). See Plus Prods. v. Plus Discount Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999, 1005 (2d Cir.
1983)(explaining that where a mark is found to be very weak, the extent of the
protection of the mark is limited "to 'the substantiallyidentical designation and/or
to the subsequent use thereof on substantially similar goods.'" (quoting Plus Prods.
v. Redken Laboratories, Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 111, 116 (T.T.A.B. 1978)(emphasis added)).
148. See infra section V(D).
149. It is well-settled that, where the products "are virtually identical... 'the
degree of similarity in the marks necessary to support a finding of infringement is
less than in the case of dissimilar, noncompeting products.'" Eaton Allen Corp. v.
Paco Impressions Corp., 405 F. Supp. 530, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)(quoting A. Smith
Bowman Distillery, Inc. v. Schenley Distillers, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 822, 826-28 (D.
Del. 1961); David Sherman Corp. v. Hueblein, Inc., 340 F.2d 377, 382 (8th Cir.
1965)). Accord RJR Foods v. White Rock Corp., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 578, 581
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1979); Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co.,
628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980).
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E.

Unfair/yree Competition

One serious consequence of the decreased scope of protection
for ornamental features of trade dresses is that unfair copying of distinctive designs may well be encouraged.1 5 0 This is because under
Godinger, only designs which are virtual line-for-line copies will
constitute infringement. As the First Circuit appreciated, a rule requiring "virtual identity" of marks would eviscerate trademark law
because "few would be stupid
enough to make exact copies of an15
other's mark or symbol." '
Applying an intense level of scrutiny, the Godinger Court observed that the designs at issue were not "virtually identical" because the Defendant's design extended slightly further down the
handle of its silverware pieces. The Court concluded that this constituted a compelling difference between the two designs.' 5 2 However, as Professor McCarthy has observed, any two marks at issue:
should not be examined with a microscope to find the differences,

for this is not the way the average purchaser views the marks. To
the average buyer, the points of similarity are more important than
minor points of difference. A court should not engage in "technical gymnastics" in an attempt5 3to find some minor differences between the conflicting marks.'
Thus, ironically, l5 4 the Decision may well permit the clever copyist to escape liability in any case involving a unique trade dress
comprised of commonly used component parts merely by making
small variations to the design.'5 s However, allowing this will benefit only the unfair copyist at the expense of both the confused consumer and the innovative designer. A trade dress differentiated
solely by inconsequential changes does not represent a new or wor150. In Godinger, the Defendant had all but admitted copying the Plaintiff's
GRANDE BAROQUE trade dress. See supra section I(A)(2).
151. Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 30 (lst Cir. 1989)(quoting
Baker v. Master Printers Union, 34 F. Supp. 808, 811 (D. N.J. 1940)). Accord 2
J.T. McCARTY, supra note 95, § 23:3 at 56 (quoting T&T Mfg. Co. v. A.T. Cross,
449 F.Supp. 813 (D. R.I. 1978), af'd, 587 F.2d 533 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied
sub nom. A.T. Cross Co. v. Quill Co., 441 U.S. 908 (1979), [laterproceeding] 477
A.2d. 939 (R.I. 1984)).
152. See Godinger,916 F.2d at 77.
153. 2 J.T McCARTHY, supra note 95, § 23:15, at 81 (footnotes omitted)(emphasis
added).
154. Godinger is even more ironic, given that in recent years, the Second Circuit
has developed a particularly stringent policy protecting trade dresses. A finding
that the defendant has copied a trade dress has heretofore often been fatal to the
defendant's case, notwithstanding that the plaintiff had failed to prove its trade
dress had acquired secondary meaning. See e.g., Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme
Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 832 (1982).
155. See, e.g., WSM, Inc. v. Tennessee Sales Co., 709 F.2d 1084, 1087 (6th Cir.
1983); Beech-Nut, Inc. v. Warner Lambert Co., 480 F.2d 801, 804 (2d Cir. 1973).
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thy contribution to art or commerce. Rather, it represents an unfair
appropriation of another's design and concomitant good will.
Although the central purpose of the law of functionality is to encourage competition, the Decision may, in fact, discourage free
competition.' s6 This is because the Decision's restrictive approach
to trade dress infringement will inevitably lessen the incentive to
create innovative trade
dresses comprised of commonly used orna7
elements.'mental

F. A Plaintiff'sLimited Scope of Protection
The Godinger Court specifically rejected the doctrine of "aesthetic" functionality as it had been articulated by the Paglierocourt
stating that it suffered from "overbreadth."' 5 s Pagliero, it found,
was "overbroad" because in every case where the aesthetic appeal
of a trade dress "contributed" to the sale of a product, trade dress
protection was automatically denied, irrespective of a finding of secondary meaning, s9
Paradoxically, the Court adopted a new standard for determining
"aesthetic" functionality which could also be viewed as overly
broad. This is because under Godinger, in every case where the
individual design features of a trade dress are commonly used by
competitors, a court may deny protection in any case where the
challenged design is not "identical or virtually identical", irrespective of a finding of secondary meaning and "confusing similarity."16 0 It is submitted that most plaintiffs will necessarily be denied
relief under the "conditional" functionality test. For example, under
this test, the Paglierodefendant would have prevailed if it had only
slightly altered the designs at issue. Similarly, under this test, the
LeSportsac defendant would also have prevailed, because the design elements were not inherently distinctive and the defendant's
goods were not "virtually identical."''
156. See, e.g., Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 428.
157. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3rd Cir.
1981).
158. Godinger, 916 F.2d at 80.
159. Id. See also Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 427.
160. Godinger, 916 F.2d at 82.
161. The district court had noted, for example, that one design element, the plaintiff's logo, was "LeSportsac", while the defendant's logo was "di paris sac".
LeSportsac, 607 F. Supp. at 184. These two terms are clearly not "virtually identical". Furthermore, the design elements consisted of carpet tape and nylon. The
defendant had presented competitors' products which utilized the same design elements, thereby demonstrating that the elements, in and of themselves, were not
unique. Id.
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G.

The Retention of "Aesthetic" Functionality

Heretofore, the doctrine of "aesthetic" functionality had generally been regarded as an alternate term for the "important ingredient" test which was articulated in Pagliero.162 Thus, when most
other circuit courts had rejected this test. the term "aesthetic" functionality was also implicitly rejected.
The Second Circuit had fol163
lowed the majority in this regard.
While the test for functionality which the Godinger Court adopts
centers on an evaluation of the hindrance to competition, the test,
nonetheless, retains the term "aesthetic" functionality. 164 Thus, the

Court would appear to be following the minority approach in this
regard.165 However, inasmuch as the test adopted by each minority
circuit was virtually the same as that of the majority, the minority's
retention of the term 16"aesthetic"
functionality was, in essence, a
6
question of semantics.
Given the "conditional" functionality test which the Godinger
Court has articulated, 1 6 7 it would appear that unlike the approach
by the minority circuits, the retention of the term "aesthetic" functionality by the Godinger Court will prove much more than a matter
of mere semantics. Indeed, the Decision would appear to be a direct descendant of Pagliero, the very case it expressly overruled.
This is because Godinger, like Pagliero,still requires the application of a special test to evaluate the functionality of ornamental
designs.
162. See supra section IM(B)(2).
163. For example, LeSportsac had involved a purely ornamental design on a
trade dress. Nonetheless, in analyzing the ornamental features of the trade dress,
the court always referred to the alleged "functionality" of the design, not the "aesthetic" functionality of the design. See LeSportsac, 754 F.2d 71.
164. Godinger,916 F.2d at 81.
165. For example, the Third Circuit has rejected the "important ingredient" test,
but retained the use of the "aesthetic" functionality nomenclature. Keene Corp. v.
Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 826 (3rd Cir. 1981); c.f. W.T. Rogers v. Keene,
778 F.2d 334, 344 (7th Cir. 1985) (adopting a more restrictive view of "aesthetic"
functionality).
It is unclear as to why these two circuit courts have retained the "aesthetic" functionality nomenclature, for they have followed the modern approach to functionality. See supra section III B(3). It is even more curious, given that these two courts
have specifically suggested that any functionality analysis is inapplicable to ornamental designs. See infra sections V(I)(1)&(2).
166. In Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1982)
the court evaluated the functionality of ornamental features of a trade dress without
reference to "aesthetic" functionality. This supports the conclusion that the Keene
court's utilization of the term "aesthetic" functionality was purely semantical. Id. at
81-82 n.4. See supra note 165.
167. See supra section IV(C).
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H. Second Circuit Precedent
Godinger mandates a special test be applied to ornamental designs; LeSportsac does not. 168 Given that LeSportsac has not been
overruled, where the precedent of both cases could apply, one must
choose between them for they are mutually exclusive. The "conditional" functionality test directly contravenes the LeSportsac test
which, as explained earlier,' 6 9 is comprised of the following three
elements:
1. Evaluation of the Design as a Whole
Under the LeSportsac test, a court should evaluate the over-al
design of the trade dress and should not dissect the design element
by element.' 70 As the LeSportsac court explained, "by breaking
LeSportsac's trade dress into its individual elements and then attacking certain of those elements as functional, K mart misconceives the
scope of appropriate inquiry."'17 1 The court concluded that
LeSportsac merely sought to protect "the particularcombination
that identify its bags and distinand arrangement of design elements
72
guish them from other bags."'1
In Godinger,Wallace had also merely sought to protect its particular arrangement of design elements. While the Plaintiff expressly
disavowed any claim to protection of the baroque design elements,17 3 the Court apparently overlooked this express qualification. 7 4 Notwithstanding the limited nature of the injunction sought,
the Court denied relief explaining that, "Wallace may not exclude
competitors from using those baroque design elements necessary to
168. Although the Godinger court discussed the particular facts of Stormy Clime
and not those of LeSportsac, the court nonetheless quoted the LeSportsac test with
approval. Godinger, 916 F.2d at 79-80. Given that LeSportsac involved purely
ornamental features, while Stormy Clime did not, Artemide, 672 F. Supp. at 707, it
would appear that of the two decisions, LeSportsac is actually more relevant to the
decision in Godinger.
169. See supra section II(B)(4).
170. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 76-77.
171. Id. at 76. In Hartford House v. Hallmark Cards, 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988), a trade dress consisting of ornamental
features was at issue. As in LeSportsac, the defendant had urged the court to view
each. of the ornamental features individually. The Tenth Circuit explained that,
"[c]ontrary to Hallmark's contention, the appropriate inquiry is not whether each
individual feature of the trade dress is functional but whether the whole collection
of features, taken together, is functional." 846 F.2d at 1272 (citations omitted).
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. Eg., Brief for Plaintiff at 11. Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger
Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, No. 90-7408, slip op. (2d
Cir. Nov. 29, 1991), petition for cert. denied, U.S.L.W. (U.S. Feb. 28, 199 1)(No.
90-1366).
174. See generally Godinger, 916 F.2d 76.
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compete in the market for baroque silverware." 17 5 Thus, under
Godinger, the rule that a court must evaluate a trade dress in its
entirety is eviscerated given that the grant of protection to a unique
arrangement of design elements is viewed as the equivalent of a
grant of protection to the elements themselves.
2.

Consideration of Availability of Alternate Designs

Under the LeSportsac test, it was incumbent upon the Defendant
to demonstrate that it would be rendered unable to effectively compete in the baroque silverware industry if it were not permitted to
simulate the GRANDE BAROQUE trade dress.' 7 6 In LeSportsac,
the court concluded that the design as a whole was non-functional,
explaining that:
K mart's ability to compete is not unduly hindered by the determination that LeSportsac's particular configuration of design features is non-functional and therefore eligible for protection....
For example, the cotton carpet tape and carrying straps could be
placed differently, contrasted in color with the bag or be made
thicker or thinner; zipper pulls could be solid or nonrectangular;
the repeating elliptical logo could be changed or placed
differently. 177
However, the Decision does not indicate that the Defendant had
provided any evidence to support a finding that it was necessary to
The Decision does provide
copy the Plaintiff's trade dress. 178
statements to the effect that protection for anything more than "identical or virtually identical" designs would be the equivalent of
granting the Plaintiff a virtual monopoly on the baroque elements. 1 7 9 Nonetheless, it does not consider the plethora of third
party designs which were successful expressions of the baroquestyle pattern yet were not "substantially similar" to the GRANDE
BAROQUE pattern.'
3.

Purchaser Motivation

Under the LeSportsac test, it was also incumbent upon the Defendant to establish that the principal motivation for the purchase of
175. Godinger, 916 F.2d at 81.
176. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 77. See generally Godinger, 916 F.2d at 76.
177. LeSportsac at 77 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). Accord Stormy
Clime, Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1987). This analysis parallels

that in most other circuits. Eg., Raulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 937 (7th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1124 (1990); First Brands v. Fred Meyer, Inc.,
809 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1987); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Freuhauf Corp.,
536 F.2d 1210, 1217; Hartford House, 846 F.2d at 1273 (10th Cir. 1988); Service
Ideas v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118, 1123 (7th Cir. 1988).
178. See generaly Godinger, 916 F.2d 76.
179. E.g., id. at 82.

180. See generally Godinger, 916 F.2d 76.
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18 1
the GRANDE BAROQUE product was its aesthetic appeal.
Nonetheless, the Decision does not contain any evidence on this issue."8 2 This aspect of the test for functionality is inexorably linked
183
to the issue of secondary meaning.
Under Godinger, however, the rule that a defendant must establish purchaser motivation is eviscerated because a court may not
consider evidence of secondary meaning if it determines that the
challenged design is merely "substantially similar."" 4

I.

The Inapplicabilityof Functionality
to Ornamental Features

1. Table-Top Products
In
the court opined that if any given feature on a
trade dress, "is ornamental, fanciful, decorative, like the patternson
a piece of china or of silverware,then the manufacturer can use it as
his name, symbol, his identifying mark."1" 6 The court explained,
"[o]rnamental, fanciful shapes and patterns are not in short supply,
so appropriatingone of them to serve as an identifying mark does
not take away from any competitor something that he needs in order
18 7
to make a competing brand."
The court maintained that the blanket denial of trade dress protection for all decorative features of table-top products would constitute "open Sesame to trademark infringement.""8 8 The court
illustrated its point as follows:
[sluppose Mr. Keene owned a complete set of Meissen china, and
one of the plates broke. He might care more about replacing it
with a plate that looked exactly like the plate that had broken than
about who made the plate; but it would not follow that someone
could make exact duplicates of Meissen china for sale to people
who care
more about aesthetic compatibility than about
18 9
W. T. Rogers,185

source.

It then explained that:
[a] design feature to be aesthetically functional must be pleasing
in itself; it is not enough that a person who owns two items with
that feature wants a matched pair. Otherwise we might be forced
to admit that General Motors can duplicate the Rolls Royce, because a person who had one Rolls Royce might think a second
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See supra section IlI(B)(4).
See generally Godinger, 916 F.2d 76.
LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 78. See supra section II(B)(2).
Godinger, 916 F.2d at 82.
W.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 339 (dictum) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
778 F.2d at 344.
Id.
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190
Rolls would look good next to it in his garage.

The court likened functionality of trade dresses to genericism of
trademarks, explaining that where a word is necessary to describe a
product that word may never be appropriated to the exclusion of all
others.' 91 So too, where a design is necessary for the construction
a generic property, and therefore, may
of a product, it is in essence,
92
not be appropriated.1
However, the court also observed that where a term is not
"generic",
[s]ince the supply of distinctive names and symbols usable for
brand identification is very large, indeed for all practical purposes infinite, competition is not impaired by giving each manu-

facturer a perpetual "monopoly" of his identifying mark;19such
3
marks are not a scarce input into the production of goods.
Although the court did not explicitly so state, it would appear that
the logical conclusion to be gleaned from the preceding analysis is
that ornamentalpatterns on silverwareand chinaware are inherently
non-generic because an infinite variety of patterns is available to
of functionality with regard to
any competitor. Thus, any analysis
1 94
these patterns is unnecessary.
2.

All Trade Dresses

Additionally, Professor McCarthy has suggested that any doctrine
of functionality ("aesthetic" or "utilitarian") is simply not applicable
to strictly ornamental design features on all trade dresses.' 9 s Indeed, while the W. T. Rogers court used certain table-top products
as examples, in that case, the design at issue had been the hexagonal shape of an office paper tray.' 9 6 Relying on its analysis of chinaware and silverware patterns, the court suggested that the
hexagonal shape of plaintiff's paper tray was non-functional, ex190. Id.
191. The court illustrates this point with the generic terms "automobile" and
"car" and the trademark "Chevrolet". Id. at 339.
192. Id. See supra section Ill(B)(1).
193. Id. at 339 (emphasis added).
194. Paglierohas been the leading case on "aesthetic" functionality. Godinger
might well become the new leading case on the subject. Given the court's suggestion in W.T. Rogers that the application of any functionality analysis (let alone,
"aesthetic" functionality) is inapplicable to cases involving silverware or chinaware
patterns, it is ironic that ornamental designs on table-top products were at issue in
both Godinger and Pagliero.
195. 1 J.T. McCRTmRY, supra note 95, § 7:26 at 247-48. See also Note, The Broad
Sweep of Aesthetic Functionality:A Threat to Trademark Protection of Aesthetic
Product Features, 51 FoRDwmx L. Rzv. 345, 380 (1982).
196. It should be noted that the Seventh Circuit seemingly regarded any "functional" analysis to be particularly inapplicable to chinaware and silverware patterns. See, e.g., W.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d 334.
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plaining that, "[t]he hexagonal shape... does nothing to enhance
the tray's utility in holding papers... [a]nd there's no suggestion that
it makes a tray cheaper to produce." 19 7 The analysis in W.T. Rogers
parallels the reasoning of Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg.
Corp.19 8 In Ideal Toy, the Third Circuit applied the doctrine of
functionality in its consideration of the color scheme of the trade
dress for the "Rubic's Cube" puzzle. The court found that, "the concern for competition ... does not extend to the circumstances of this
case in which the possible trade dress variationsare limited only by
the designers' imaginations."'9 9 This "concern" is central to any
functionality analysis, 20 0 and, as Ideal Toy and W. T. Rogers suggest,
is not present in all cases where strictly ornamental features are at
issue.
3.

The Applicability of the Merely OrnamentalRule

Judge Rich has suggested that, "it is arguable that there is no
'doctrine' of aesthetic functionality which stands alone, without con20
sideration of the more traditional principles of trademark law."
Building on Judge Rich's observation, Professor McCarthy has
suggested that the "merely ornamental" rule protects society's interest in avoiding the monopolization of marks that do not serve a
trademark purpose. He has explained:
"Aesthetic functionality" is an inappropriateresponse to a valid
concern. The concern is over features which are merely ornamen-

tal and therefore not perceived by customers as indicia of origintrademarks. However, trademark law has long had a rule to deal
with that situation: the "merely ornamental"rule. The "merely ornamental" rule is merely a facet of the basic trademark question:
is the disputed feature in fact perceived by customers as a trademark or not? Do customers perceive this feature as mere attractive ornamentation or as a symbol that identifies and distinguishes
a single source?. 2
A prerequisite to prevailing on any trade dress claim of infringement is proof that the trade dress has achieved secondary meaning.
However, this is also a necessary component of any consideration of
protectability under the merely ornamental rule. Moreover, the
early "'non-functional'

unfair competition cases" and the cases de-

197. Id. at 343. The court had found that the instructions to the jury were in error
and therefore, ordered a new trial. However, notwithstanding its suggestion that
the design was non-functional, it ordered that the issue of functionality be evaluated on remand. Id. at 338.
198. 685 F.2d 78 (3rd Cir. 1982).
199. Id. at 81-82 n.4 (emphasis added).
200. See supra section III(B).
201. In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
202. 1 J.T. McCAsrwf, supra note 95, § 7:26 at 247-48 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted), see supra section III(A)(2).
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cided later under the merely ornamental rule illustrate that a court
need not address the issue of functionality in order to determine the
protectability of trade dresses containing ornamental designs.2 °3
In view of the foregoing, the following argument by Professor McCarthy is highly persuasive:
[t]rademarklaw and policy does not need the theory of "aesthetic
functionality." The policy it purports to serve can be more fairly
and accurately performed by the tried and true rule of "merely
ornamental", where customer perception is the guide, not a
court's notion of what is "an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product."
What neither consumers nor the law of trademark needs is a
new "public policy" which denies trademark [protection] to symbols which customers 2perceive
and rely on as trademarks in their
04
purchasing decisions.
The LeSportsac court 20 5 made it quite clear that a central inquiry
to any determination of functionality should entail evaluating the
principal purchaser motivation.2 0 6 Query, is this not the question
posed in any evaluation as to whether a design has acquired secondary meaning? 20 7 It is suggested that whether couched in one
phrase or another, the ultimate inquiry should be whether the design
at issue functions as an indication of source and is therefore entitled
to protection from misappropriation.
203. See supra section ]II(A).

204. 1 J.T. McCauRTHY, supra note 95, § 7:26 at 248. Several trademark commentators appear to concur with Professor McCarthy. E.g., A.L. Fletcher, The Defense
of "Functional" Trademark Use: If What Is Functional Cannot Be a Trademark,

How Can a TrademarkBe Functional?,75 TRADMuuRK Rim. 249, 267-68 (1982); B.J.
Duft, Aesthetic Functionality, 73

TRADuMAR

Rzp. 151, 202 (1982); A.S. Oddi, The

Functions of "Functionality" in Trademark Law, 76 TRADnu.m REP 308, 348
(1986).
205. See LeSportsac, 754 F.2d 71.
206. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 78. Purchaser motivation is central to virtually
every circuit court's evaluation of functionality. E.g., American Greetings Corp. v.
Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3rd Cir. 1986).
207. Professor. McCarthy agrees that an evaluation of purchaser motivation is
central to determining both "aesthetic" functionality and secondary meaning. He
states that:
[m]any of the cases using the "aesthetic functionality" rationale might well
have been decided the same way on a principled analysis by application
of the "merely ornamental" rule. In fact, many opinions appear to use the
two approaches in an uneasy synthesis.
1 J.T. McCAwrY, supra note 95, § 7:26 at 248 n.1S. Professor McCarthy cites to
Damn I'm Good, Inc. v. Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) in support of this observation. In Damn I'm Good, although the court had ostensibly followed the "important ingredient" test, the decision appears to be based in large
measure on the finding that the mark in question had played "an insignificant role
...in identifying the source of plaintiff's [goods]." Id. at 1362.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, it is submitted that in cases involving trade dress ornamental features:
- any variation of an "aesthetic" functionality analysis represents a
superfluous addition to the law of functionality, and
- any functionality analysis represents a superfluous addition to
the merely ornamental rule.
It is suggested that given that variations of ornamental designs are
virtually limitless, functionality is not needed to prevent the monopolization of any given pattern. It is further suggested that given the
heavy burden of proof which a plaintiff must meet to establish secondary meaning, the merely ornamental rule contains sufficient protection against the unwarranted appropriation of trade dress
designs. It is finally suggested that a proper application of the "Polaroid Factors" would ensure that very weak trademarks would be
accorded only limited protection.
At a minimum, it is submitted that the LeSportsac functionality
analysis should be applied in lieu of the Godinger "conditional"
functionality analysis. Many trade dresses contain ornamental elements which will not be found inherently distinctive if analyzed individually. Under Godinger, all trade dresses with commonly used
design elements could be granted only the most limited protection
possible irrespective of whether the combination was distinctive.
The implications of this restrictive approach are quite serious, for
the marketplace could well be flooded with trade dresses which are
not only "substantially similar" but also "confusingly similar".
Therefore, the application of a "conditional" functionality analysis
could well foster unfair competition and hinder innovative design.
If the Second Circuit merely reverted back to the standard for
determining the functionality of ornamental features that was established in LeSportsac and Stormy Clime, it is suggested that, when all
is said and done, plaintiffs would be entitled to the same protection
as they would if the merely ornamental rule and the "PolaroidFactors" were applied. However, much less need be said or done if all
variations of the doctrine of functionality were recognized as inapplicable to the evaluation of trade dress ornamental design features.

